Vacancy durations by Ours, J.C. & Ridder, G.
^ l-lb 
ET 
05348 
Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie 
Serie research memoranda 
Vacancy Durations: Search or Selection? 
J.C. van Ours 
G. Ridder 
Research Memorandum 1992-16 
April 1992 
applied 
labour 
economics 
research 
team 
vrije Universiteit amsterdam 

VACANCY DURATIONS: SEARCH OR SELECTION ? 
J.C. van Ours 
Department of Economics 
Vrije Universiteit 
1007 MC Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
G. Ridder 
Department of Economics 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 
9700 AV Groningen 
The Netherlands 
Amsterdam/Groningen, March 1992 
1 
Abstract 
In van Ours and Ridder (1992) we showed that employers use a 
nonsequential search strategy, when filling job vacancies. In this paper we 
explicitly decompose a vacancy duration into an application period and a 
selection period. We formuiate a simple theory for the determination of the 
application period. By making some distributional assumptions we obtain 
estimates of the average application and selection period. We conclude that 
vacancy durations are devoted to selection. 
Keywords and phrases: Vacancies, duration, hiring 
JEL-classification: J6 
2 
1. Introduction 
There is a renewed interest in the use of vacancy data in empirical 
macro-economics. Following the lead of Diamond (1971), economists consider 
the matching of jobs and workers in the labor market as a productive 
activity, that can be described by a production function, the matching 
function. In the matching function the number of new hires is related to 
the number of workers (employed or unemployed) who are looking for a job 
and the number of jobs who are looking for a worker, i.e. the number of job 
vacancies1. If the matching function has constant returns to scale, as is 
confirmed in most empirical studies, then the matching function implies a 
stable relationship between the average duration of unernployment and the 
average duration of vacancies. 
As stressed by Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Jackman, Layard and 
Pissarides (1989), decomposing changes of these durations in movements 
along and shifts of this relation is helpful in understanding the causes of 
cyclical and secular changes in the unernployment rate. For instance, 
Jackman, Layard and Pissarides find that between 1960 and 1982 the 
unemployment/vacancy duration curve has shifted outward in the UK, and by a 
process of elimination they conclude, that the cause of this shift is that 
the unemployed have decreased their intensity of search. 
Although the measurement of unernployment has its own ambiguities, it 
is clear that the concept of a job vacancy is the more elusive of the two. 
In a steady state the number of job vacancies is equal to the product of 
the rate at which vacancies are created and the average duration of the 
vacancies. It is usually assumed, that the number of vacancies at a firm is 
equal to the difference between the number of productive jobs and the 
present number of employees, so that the rate at which vacancies are 
created is equal to the sum of the net rate at which productive jobs are 
generated and the rate at which employees quit. The determination of the 
duration of the vacancy depends on the search strategy of the employers. In 
van Ours and Ridder (1992) we show that employers use a nonsequential 
search strategy: applicants arrive shortly after the vacancy has been 
posted, and the rest of the vacancy duration is used to select a new 
Although the matching function approach goes back to at least Holt 
(1970), more recent contributions are Jackman, Layard and Pissarides 
(1989) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989). 
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employee from the pool of applicants. Hence, a vacancy duration consists of 
an application period, during which applicants arrive, and a selection 
period, during which a new employee is chosen from the pool of applicants. 
In this paper we propose a simple method to estimate the length of both 
periods using data on applicant arrivals. We find, that employers spend far 
more time on selecting than on attracting applicants. 
The distinction between application and selection is important for an 
unambiguous interpretation of shifts of the unemployment/vacancy duration 
curve. If vacancy durations are mainly selection periods, then an increase 
in the vacancy duration for a given duration of unemployment does not 
necessarily imply that the search effort of the unemployed has decreased. 
It only indicates, that employers spend more time on, and presumably put 
more effort in, the selection of a new employee from a pool of applicants, 
that is formed in the same short time interval as before. 
Because our data pertain to a particular year, 1987, we do not know 
how application and selection periods vary over the cycle. This is a major 
weakness of our results. Our contribution is a simple method to estimate 
both components of the vacancy duration. If in the vacancy surveys, that in 
The Netherlands are conducted yearly, a question on the number of 
applicants for a vacancy would be included, our method could be used to 
obtain yearly estimates of both components. 
2. Some theoretical considerations 
Van Ours and Ridder (1992) find that in their sample of job vacancies 
the applicant arrival rate is high during the first few weeks after a 
vacancy has been posted and is small during the rest of the duration of the 
vacancy, whüe the rate at which vacancies are filled is almost zero during 
the first month and increases during the next four months. This indicates 
that employers use a nonsequential search strategy when filling job 
vacancies. Most new employees are hired from a pool of applicants that is 
formed shortly after the vacancy is opened2. Moreover, it takes some time 
before a suitable new employee is selected from the pool of applicants. 
This result comes as no surprise, because it is well-known (Gal, 
2 
This is also consistent with the observation that 69% of the vacancies 
are advertised with 80% of these being advertised only once. 
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Landsberger, and Levykson (1981) and Morgan (1983)), that a compound 
strategy in which the searcher can generate more than one offer at some 
cost dominates a sequential search strategy. Moreover, employers put effort 
into the assessment of the suitability of applicants (Barron and Bishop 
(1985) and Barron, Bishop, and Dunkelberg (1985)), and this assessment 
takes time. Hence, the empirical finding that a vacancy duration can be 
divided in an application period and a selection period makes sense from a 
search theoretical perspective. 
What determines the length of the application and selection periods ? 
First, we shall present a very stylized model for the determination of the 
application period, that we denote by T. The selection period has length S. 
During the application period applicants arrive at a rate fi. An applicant 
is characterized by the revenue product x, which is a draw from a 
distribution with distribution function F. At the end of the application 
period there is a pool of N(T) applicants. In the selection period the 
revenue product of the applicants is assessed, and at the end of the 
selection period the applicant with the largest revenue product is selected 
from the pool of applicants. The remaining pool of applicants at time T+S 
is smaller than N(T) due to attrition from the pool at rate 6. In the 
sequel we ignore random variation around the mean in the size of the pool 
at T+S, i.e. the size of the pool at T+S is piT-SS. 
Employers set the wage w before the start of the application period on 
the basis of the expected productivity of the new employee. Morale problems 
with incumbent employees will restrict the employer's possibilities to 
bargain over the wage, and we shall assume that such bargaining does not 
occur. 
For given S the employer maximizes the following expected discounted 
(at rate r) profit 
-r(T+S) oo
 T_ss e-r(T+S) (1) E(P(T,S)) = e—~ ( jil-Fixf1 db)dx - w) = e— p(T,S) 
If p(T,S) denotes the instantaneous expected profit flow, then the first 
order condition is 
( 2) r = dl0^T^ 
\ 
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Hence T equates the discount rate to the relative change in the profit rate 
associated with a one time unit increase in T . 
The solution to (2) satisfies 
(3a) duT/dfi > 0 
(3b) dlogT/dlogS = ÖlogT/dlogS = 6S/fiT > 0 
(3c) dT/dw > 0 
(3d) dT/dr < 0 
From (3a) it foliows that the size of the pool of applicants increases with 
the arrival rate of applicants. The sign of the derivative of the 
application period with respect to the arrival rate is ambiguous4, but 
likely to be negative. From (3b) we conclude that the elasticities of T 
with respect to the attrition rate and the selection period are predicted 
to be identical and equal to the relative size of the attrition and the 
initial pool of applicants. In particular, 9T/3S=0 if 6=0. Hence, if there 
is no attrition the application and selection periods are independent. In a 
tight labor market /x will be small and 6 large. In that case we expect a 
relatively long application period, and the reverse holds in an easy labor 
market. Hence, we predict procyclical variations in T. From (3c) we obtain 
that jobs that command a high wage, have a relatively long application 
period. 
If we take the size of the pool of applicants f/T as a measure of 
extensive search, then the inequalities (3a) and (3c) are in line with the 
results of Barron and Bishop (1985) and Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg 
(1985), who find that there is more extensive search for vacancies that 
have a large arrival rate of applicants, and that there is a positive 
correlation between the starting wage and extensive search. 
Until now we have treated the selection period S as given. Building a 
3 
It is not difficult to show that (2) has a unique positive solution. 
4 If Tr>l or if firms make zero profit on the marginal employee, then the 
application period decreases with the arrival rate of applicants. 
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model for S requires knowledge of the selection technology used by 
employers. The length of the selection period is determined by the 
selection capacity of the firm and the intensity of the selection. The 
intensity of selection, measured by the number of honrs spent on selection 
per applicant, has been studied by Barron et al., who find that 
restrictions on firing employees and the training involved in the job have 
a large positive effect on the intensity of the selection procedure. In 
general, we expect that selection is more intensive if the contract is more 
risky from the point of view of the employer. In our empirical model we 
shall include variables to test this hypothesis. 
3. Data and estimation results 
3.1. Data 
The data are taken from the Organization of Strategie Labor Market 
Research (OSA) vacancy survey. This survey was conducted in two stages. In 
the first stage with interviews in November-January 1986-1987, a sample of 
employers gave information on the incomplete duration of their vacancies 
and the cumulative number of applicants at the date of the first interview 
of the survey. Furthermore, some characteristics of the employer and the 
vacancies were recorded. Unfortunately, neither characteristics of the 
applicants, nor wage offers (if any) made to applicants were collected. In 
the second stage of the survey, conducted some four months later, employers 
were asked for the date at which the vacancies of the first interview were 
filled (if they were filled). In this paper we use a subsample of 670 
vacancies, of which 496 (74%) were filled at the date of the second 
interview . The data are summarized in table 1. 
Table 1 about here 
Most variables need no discussion. The advertisement dummy refers to 
the placement of a personnel advertisement (l=yes), and the labor exchange 
dummy is 1 if the labor exchange has been notified. If the selection 
5 A more detailed description of the survey and the selection that is used 
in the present paper can be found in van Ours and Ridder (1992). 
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procedure involves a psychological test then the corresponding dummy is 1. 
3.2. An empirical model 
To obtain estimates of the average application and selection periods 
we propose a simple statistical model that uses information on the length 
of the vacancy and the arrival of applicants. To be specific, we assume 
that T and S are Exponentially distributed with parameters 6 and A. 
Applicants arrive according to a Poisson process with intensity /i. We 
relate the intensities to a vector of explanatory variables X 
(4) /i = exptfA'X) , 0 = exp(pT'X) , A = exptfs'X) 
There is no hiring during the application period, and no applicants arrive 
during the selection period. This is in line with the evidence in van Ours 
and Ridder (1992). 
Let tt denote the incomplete vacancy duration at the date of the 
(first) interview. The number of applicants at t t has density (with respect 
to the counting measure) 
(5) f(k\h,T) = 
(fiti) expi-fit^/kl if tx<T 
(fj.T)\xp(-fiT)/kl if t{>T 
Integrating out T we obtain 
(6) ƒ(*!«!) = ƒ ((fiT) e /k\) Be d r + ((^x) e ykl) e l 
and the probability that no applicant has arrived by t t is 
e + fie 
(7) f(0\h) = 
Ai +0 
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In the likelihood function we only use the information that either no 
person (group 1) or at least one person (group 2) has applied at the date 
of the first interview. In this way we minimize the impact of measurement 
and recollection errors. Inspection of the data reveals that there is 
considerable rounding of the number of applicants, and that for a number of 
vacancies the reported number of applicants in the second interview is 
lower than that reported in the first interview. We expect that the 
information on whether there has been at least one applicant or not is less 
affected by recollection errors than the reported number of applicants. The 
resulting contribution to the likelihood function is 
(8) ix = n non,) n (1-/(01*!)) 
Because there is no hiring during the application period, we find for 
the density function of the (complete) vacancy duration 
0 if t<T 
(9) h(t\T) = 
Xexp(-X(t-T)) if t>T 
Hence 
-At -et 
A0(e -e ) 
(10) h(t) = 
B-X 
In the likelihood function we shall use information on the conditional 
residual duration t2 given the incomplete duration tv The residual 
duration is observed at the second interview. The corresponding density is 
h(ti+t2) 
(11) h[t2\tx) = 
l-tf(ti) 
with H the distribution function of the complete vacancy duration. 
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At the date of the second interview some vacancies have been filled at 
a known date (group 1), some will still be open (group 2), and some have 
been filled at some unknown date between the first and second interview 
(group 3). Hence, the (conditional on tj) likelihood function is 
(12) L2 = n hfafa) n ƒ heitjes n /V|*i)<fc 
t 2 o 
Note that to minimize recollection errors we do not use the information on 
the incomplete vacancy duration at the date of the first interview. The 
complete likelihood function is the product of Lx in (8) and L2 in (12). 
3.3. Estimation results 
By maximizing the likelihood function, i.e. the product of Lj and L2, 
we obtain Maximum Likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model. 
These ML estimates are reported in table 2. 
Table 2 about here 
Given the limited amount of information that we use, it is not 
surprising that many parameters are poorly determined. More reliable data 
on the number of applicants can improve this substantially. In particular, 
the regression parameters that refer to the application period have large 
variances: the included explanatory variables seem to have no impact on the 
mean application period. For that reason we estimated a restricted version 
of the model in which the mean application period is constant. The results 
are reported in the second column of table 2. 
If we concentrate on the parameters that are significantly different 
from zero, then we conclude that the mean selection period increases with 
the required level of education and experience. Given the restrictions on 
the firing of employees in the Netherlands, it is likely that employers 
perceive contracts with higher skilled workers as relatively risky. Note 
that required education and experience have no effect on the applicant 
arrival rate. It comes as no surprise, that the applicant arrival rate is 
much larger for vacancies that have been advertised. Notification of the 
10 
labor exchange does not lead to a larger flow of applicants. Larger firms 
also attract more applicants, but the monitoring problem that one expects 
in large firms, does not lead to a longer selection period. Selection 
procedures that involve a psychological test take more time than procedures 
without such a test. Selection periods for commercial jobs are relatively 
short. 
From Li in (8) we can estimate pA and f3T, and from L2 in (12) (3T and 
j3s. Hence, as a simple specification test we can check whether the 
estimates of (3T agree. For both sets of estimates in table 2 we can not 
reject equality (LR-statistics 11.6 (9 d.f.) and .2 (1 d.f.)). Moreover, it 
is easily verified, that the simplification in column 2 is allowed 
(LR-statistic 12.8 (8 d.f.)). Finally, we introduced unobserved 
heterogeneity in the constant of A (two mass-points with locations 
estimated jointly with the corresponding probabilities). This did not 
improve the fit of the model significantly (-logL is 1956.8). 
Using the estimates in the second column of table 2 we compute mean 
selection and application periods and the expected number of applicants. 
The explanatory variables are set at their mean values reported in the last 
column of table 1. The results are 
Mean application period: 3.1 weeks 
Mean selection period: 14.6 weeks 
Required education primary level 9.9 weeks 
Required education university 21.1 weeks 
No experience required 12.1 weeks 
Expected cumulative number of 
applicants during application period: 4.3 
We conclude from these computations that vacancy durations are mainly 
selection periods. This is in line with the results reported in van Ours 
and Ridder (1992). In comparing the expected number of applicants reported 
here with the number in table 1, one has to bear in mind that the latter 
number is most likely affected by recollection errors. Our confidence in 
the results is boosted by the sensible patterns that emerge by looking at 
different types of vacancies. 
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The estimated mean application period is short. This is not 
surprising. In 1986-1987 about 1% of the employers in manufacturing 
reported production problems because of difficulties in hiring employees. 
In the 70's this number fluctuated around 12%6. Hence, in the period of the 
survey very few employers had difficulties in attracting applicants, and 
this is reflected in a short mean application period. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed a simple method for the decomposition 
of (average) vacancy durations in application and selection periods. Our 
estimates confirm our earlier result that vacancy durations are mainly 
selection periods, and that attracting a pool of applicants takes 
relatively little time. Our results imply that the shift in the 
unemployment/vacancy duration curve, that has been observed by a number of 
authors may be due to longer selection periods, i.e. by increased 
choosiness on the side of the employers, and not to a lower search 
intensity of the unemployed. For more definitive conclusions we would like 
to repeat the analysis at various stages of the business cycle. 
Acknowledgement: The authors would like to thank Ruud Koning and Ken 
Burdett for helpful comments. 
6 These numbers are taken from the CBS Business Cycle Test (various 
years). 
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Table 1. Sample means 
Füled at 
2nd interview 
Open at 
2nd interview 
All 
vacancies 
Job requirements 
Required education (level)1' 
Required experience (years) 
2.98 
1.21 
3.29 
1.73 
3.06 
1.35 
Type of job 
Commercial2* 
Manufacturing ' 
0.48 
0.23 
0.27 
0.31 
0.42 
0.26 
Recruitment channels 
Advertisement 
Labor exchange 
0.59 
0.31 
0.58 
0.34 
0.59 
0.31 
Firm charateristics 
Number of employees (* 
Psychological test 
1000) 0.39 
0.25 
0.50 
0.39 
0.44 
0.29 
Elapsed duration (months) 1.82 
Cumulative number of applicants 
at date first interview 12.1 
N 496 
2.53 
8.0 
174 
2.01 
11.1 
670 
1) The levels are: 
1 = primary 
2 = extended primary 
3 = secondary 
4 = higher vocational 
5 = university 
2) CBS classification: 3, 4, 5 
(service, clerical, commercial) 
3) CBS classification: 6, 7 
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Table 2. Estimation results (Standard errors) 
Applicant arrival rate (n) 
Constant -0.35 (0.70) -0.63 (0.44) 
Required education 
Required experience 
-0.27 (0.21) 
0.06 (0.21) 
0.00 (0.13) 
-0.12 (0.09) 
Commercial 
Manufacturing 
0.72 (0.55) 
1.22 (0.84) 
0.29 (0.22) 
0.22 (0.27) 
Advertisement 
Labor exchange 
1.19 (0.54)** 
0.32 (0.41) 
1.18 (0.19)** 
0.18 (0.20) 
No. of employees 
Psychological test 
0.21 (0.23) 
-0.21 (0.36) 
0.34 (0.17)** 
0.15 (0.23) 
Application period (6) 
Constant -0.93 (0.80) -1.13 (0.11)** 
Required education 
Required experience 
-0.33 (0.23) 
0.24 (0.24) 
Commercial 
Manufacturing 
0.63 (0.70) 
1.27 (0.96) 
Advertisement 
Labor exchange 
0.06 (0.61) 
0.20 (0.42) 
No. of employees 
Psychological test 
-0.19 (0.21) 
-0.42 (0.40) 
Selection period (A) 
Constant -1.94 (0.32)** -1.98 (0.19)** 
Required education 
Required experience 
-0.11 (0.09) 
-0.19 (0.09)** 
-0.19 (0.05)** 
-0.14 (0.04)** 
Commercial 
Manufacturing 
0.21 (0.25) 
-0.39 (0.22)* 
0.38 (0.11)** 
-0.20 (0.14) 
Advertisement 
Labor exchange 
0.11 (0.17) 
-0.10 (0.14) 
0.12 (0.09) 
-0.06 (0.10) 
No. of employees 
Psychological test 
0.01 (0.10) 
-0.14 (0.17) 
-0.07 (0.07) 
-0.20 (0.11)* 
- log L 
- log Lx 
- log L2 
1951.3 
319.2 
1626.3 
1957.7 
324.9 
1632.7 
**: significant at 5%-level 
*: significant at 10%-level 
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